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Abstract
This study examines the meaning‐making work of transnational cultural references in protest. Whether using the image of
the superhero or re‐mixing a famous painting, the presence of such references in home‐made protest placards was a strik‐
ing feature of the 2017 anti‐corruption protests in Romania. By means of a qualitative analysis of 58 such signs, this study
identifies five types of transnational cultural resources co‐opted in the local protest: politics, high and popular culture,
brand names, computer culture, and other motivational slogans and protest symbols. Such references are appropriated in
local protest for their recognizability potential, their generic interpretive frames, or their usefulness in generating surpris‐
ing re‐iterations of the political cause. Yet, the use of such references remains interwoven with the symbolic and political
capital of professional, middle‐class elites. In the Romanian case, the use of these transnational cultural references also
constructs the protesters as cosmopolitan and aligned with Western cultural consumption and political practices. In turn,
this frames political opponents as backwards, parochial, and unfit for democratic politics.
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1. Introduction
This study focuses on the meaning‐making work of
transnational cultural references in protest. Using data
from the 2017 anti‐corruption protests in Romania,
the study asks how symbolic resources from other
geopolitical and cultural contexts become re‐used in
national protests and how this glocalized meaning‐
making work contributes to the mobilization and ampli‐
fication of protests.
Transnational references such as HBO series, Italian
Renaissance paintings, English novels, or North Korean
politics, for instance, are reused in homemade protest
visuals such as banners, protests placards, or art instal‐
lations. Protest visuals condense everyday political talk
(Graham & Hajru, 2011), participate in collective iden‐
tity building, and provide photographic opportunities
for media coverage and social media circulation and
archiving (Faulkner, 2013; Juris, 2008; Mattoni & Teune,
2014). Where the transnational diffusion of collective
identity and action frames has been studied in rela‐
tion to social movements (della Porta & Kriesi, 1999;
della Porta & Mattoni, 2014), there is less attention
to how seemingly global cultural references are mobi‐
lized in national protest to generate novel expressions of
civic dissent. Furthermore, the role of visuals in protest
communication remains understudied (Mattoni & Teune,
2014; Philipps, 2012; Rovisco & Veneti, 2017). This study
draws attention to an underexamined form of the glo‐
calization of protest, and adds to existing examinations
of visuals in protests. As such, the study addresses
the following empirical questions: Which transnational
Media and Communication, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 239–248 239
cultural references aremobilized in national protest; and
how do these references contribute to local political
meaning‐making?
2. The 2017 Anti‐Corruption Protests in Romania
The 2017 #rezist/OUG13 anti‐corruption protests in
Romania represent a case of sustained protests against
an ongoing political issue endemic to post‐communist
political systems: the corruption of the political elites
(Olteanu & Beyerle, 2017). Recent activism in Romania
has been nationally‐oriented, defined by an overarch‐
ing concern with the effects of communism in the
democratic and economic development of the country,
and reflective of the pro‐European, middle‐class ethos
(Gubernat & Rammelt, 2021). A cause of ongoing protest,
corruption has been framed by local activists and polit‐
ical commentators as a consequence of communism’s
“unresolved issues of the past” (Abăseacă, 2018, p. 681),
eventually growing into a “quasi‐hegemonic metanarra‐
tive and identity marker of the urban middle class in
Romania” (Kiss & Székely, 2021, p. 11).
Such national activism also has transnational dimen‐
sions. Successive waves of citizen mobilizations since
the early 2010s had echoed the mobilizational prac‐
tices and organizational values of thewider anti‐austerity
movements. “[D]ecisionsmade by consensus, the lack of
leaders, horizontality, the occupation of public square”
(Abăseacă, 2018, p. 681) have also infused the 2017
anti‐corruption protests, yet they were appropriated
“without including a criticism of neoliberalism and of lib‐
eral democracy or showing a sensitivity toward social
issues that were important aspects for the post‐2011
anti‐austerity mobilizations” (Abăseacă, 2018, p. 681).
Furthermore, these protests have also been widely sup‐
ported by expat communities which relied on social
media (under the hashtag #rezist) to create transnational
resonance for the national protests (Mercea, 2020).
These communities held protests in other countries,
drawing international media attention to the situation
in Romania while also livecasting the events and sharing
protest visuals on the social media accounts of the orga‐
nizers in Romania.
The 2017 #rezist protests were fueled by ongo‐
ing discontent, largely among the urban young and
the middle‐class, with the corruption of the political
elites represented by the ruling Social Democrat Party
(PSD; Gubernat & Rammelt, 2021; Kiss & Székely, 2021).
The party’s president, Liviu Dragnea, had a previous
fraud conviction andwas under criminal investigation for
another act of corruption at the time of the protests.
The latter erupted when PSD attempted to pass a leg‐
islative package that would have decriminalized acts of
corruption under approx. 40,000 euro. This would have
effectively exonerated Dragnea in the ongoing investiga‐
tion against him. In spite of warnings from the Romanian
president and other public bodies that such a legislative
package would be a step back in the fight against cor‐
ruption; and, in spite of a demonstration against this
package that had just taken place, the government still
pushed through with the legal changes by means of an
emergency ordinance (also known as OUG13) passed
late‐night on January 31, 2017.
The press conference that night became a major
political blunder. The JusticeMinister refused to take any
questions about the passing of the emergency ordinance,
provoking widespread anger among both journalists and
citizens watching from home. Within hours, thousands
of people had gathered throughout the entire country
(Olteanu & Beyerle, 2017). In early February, a mass
protest brought together over 500,000 people across the
country (Mercea, 2020). And, although the emergency
ordinancewas nullified and the JusticeMinister resigned,
mass demonstrations continued with some estimates
putting them at 150,000 to 200,000 protesters daily
(Olteanu & Beyerle, 2017). Throughout 2017 and 2018,
citizens continued to take the streets intermittently in
response to the government’s renewed attempts to curb
the anti‐corruption legal and institutional framework.
3. Transnational Cultural References in Protest Visuals
This section engages with two dimensions of protest
placards: the specifics and functions of visual meaning‐
making in protest; and their transnational dimension.
These dimensions provide a theoretical framework for
the understanding themeaning‐making work performed
by the transnational cultural references used in the
protest signs analyzed here.
3.1. Visual Objects and Meaning‐Making
Whether taking the form of a text, a photograph, a
drawing, an installation, a costume, or combinations
thereof, protest signs are objects displayed to be seen by
others. This visual dimension complexifies theirmeaning‐
making work. In cases where photographs, drawings,
illustrations, or even costumes are used, signification is
affected by the “perception of likeness or resemblance
or analogous form” (Mitchell, 2015, as cited in Gori,
2016, p. 41). The analysis of such signification work
has to consider the process of sensorial recognition and
ensuing emotional reactions entailed in visual meaning‐
making, as the latter combines “aesthetic familiarity”
and “generic meanings” to convey “collectively shared
but often inchoate and diffuse sentiments and under‐
standings” (Bartmanski, 2015, p. 17).
Analytically, three layers of meaning‐making can be
distinguished in visual objects (Panofsky, 1970, as cited
in van Leeuwen, 2011). The representational layer elicits
an understanding spurred by familiarity with the conven‐
tions of the genre, such as the recognition of the overall
communicative purposes and of the general traditions
of home‐made protest signs. Iconographical symbolism
resembles the connotative level of signs, drawing atten‐
tion to the cultural baggage and semantic associations
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of the people or places in an image. Finally, iconologi‐
cal symbolism speaks to the wider ideological message
that the visual as a whole seeks to convey. Panofsky
explains this layer of analysis as an effort to “ascertain
those underlying principles which reveal the basic atti‐
tudeof a nation, a period, a class, a religious or philosoph‐
ical persuasion” (Panofsky, 1970, as cited in van Leeuwen,
2011, p. 11).
Some visuals also become iconic, meaning they
achieve “wholly exceptional levels of widespread rec‐
ognizability” (Kemp, 2012, as cited in Hubbert, 2014,
p. 115). Iconic visuals emerge as a “dominant symbolic
representation of the events” gaining seemingly univer‐
sal normative undertones such as good/bad (Hubbert,
2014, p. 115). In such cases, emotional grip, recogniz‐
ability, and the naturalization of meaning intersect in
conveying a message. Iconic visuals in/of protest “reflect
social knowledge and dominant ideologies; they shape
understanding of specific events and periods; they influ‐
ence political action by modelling relationships between
civic actors; and they provide figural resources for subse‐
quent communicative action” (Hariman& Lucaites, 2002,
p. 366). Furthermore, iconic visuals can potentially be
“diffused more easily over cultural, linguistic, ideological
and political borders and can have a unifying effect on
a public sphere by focusing debates on issues of shared
relevance” (Mortensen & Trenz, 2016, p. 258).
While this makes them powerful means of com‐
municating, amplifying the political values underpin‐
ning protests (Olesen, 2014; Rovisco, 2017; Wetzstein,
2017), visuals have also been criticized for their
“dumbing‐down’’ potential and propensity towards play‐
ing upon the spectacular which may presumably down‐
play critical thinking and rational engagement with poli‐
tics (Parry, 2015).
3.2. Visuals in/of Protest
Visuals fulfill multiple functions in protest: convey
information, document injustice, participate in identity‐
building and mobilization, attract media attention to
amplify the cause, and generate debate (Casas &
Williams, 2019; Faulkner, 2013; Mattoni & Teune, 2014;
Milner, 2013;Mortensen&Trenz, 2016). Prominently dis‐
played by individuals during protest, placards are a form
of public voice and a performance of citizenship. Their
political message links the individual to the collective by
simultaneously conveying the individual’s political stance
and articulating it with the wider protest cause. In the
process of being seen by others, protest signs participate
in the generation of collective identities and solidarity
among protesters (Vanni, 2007).
Placards also constitute opportunities for protest
image generation. In a political world where images pro‐
liferate, images in/of protest often struggle to achieve
visibility in the public sphere (Rovisco & Veneti, 2017).
Striking protest signsmake for great photographic oppor‐
tunities, while their concise and slogan‐like nature pro‐
vides testimonials for the news reporting of the actual
events (Mattoni & Teune, 2014). In decentralized and dig‐
itally mediated protests where individual organizers or
leaders can be difficult to identify, this can prove to be
particularly useful. Yet, as shownby the protest paradigm
literature, media coverage has often foregrounded the
spectacular side at the expense of the political demands
of protests (McCurdy, 2012).
In today’s panmediated political world (De Luca et al.,
2012, p. 500), social media offer protesters new means
of circulating and archiving protest visuals that co‐exist
alongside traditional media (Mattoni & Teune, 2014;
Poell, 2014). Even more so than a journalistic photo‐
graph of a protest, images captured by participating cit‐
izens convey a sense of spontaneity and authenticity
(Wetzstein, 2017, p. 31). Growing online circulation can
both attract media’s attention to the cause and expand
the face‐to‐face protest by creating a space for social and
political discussion (Milner, 2013). Social media chatter
and virality can thus boost protest communication, influ‐
encing the public agenda without having to rely (exclu‐
sively) on the amplification and legitimation brought
about by news media coverage, while also extending the
lifecycle of a protest beyond the presence of bodies on
the streets. Yet, while they may bring in distant, poten‐
tially global publics (Mattoni & Teune, 2014), the “instant
news icons” generated through social media chatter and
virality can also remain transient (that is, they easily dis‐
appear from collective memory) and recognizable only
to fragmented publics (Mortensen, 2016).
Finally, handmade protest signs are also tokens of
vernacular creativity. Ingenious and playful crafting of
political meaning‐making often plays upon collective
semantic reservoirs and “complex sets of inter‐visual
relations” (Faulkner, 2013, p. 14). In so doing, they can
simultaneously reproduce and transform these semiotic
resources. As forms of “vernacular creativity” (Burgess,
2006), protest visuals merge political agency and resis‐
tance with belonging, playfulness, and aesthetic innova‐
tion. “Vernacular creativity” is thus a “process by which
available cultural resources… are recombined in novel
ways, so that they are both recognizable because of their
familiar elements, and create affective impact through
the innovative process of this recombination” (Burgess,
2006, p. 206). By remixing cultural resources to gener‐
ate new texts and chains of signification, protest plac‐
ards also enhance the virality of cultural references.
Protest visuals can thus simultaneously fulfill several
social and communicational functions, working at once
as an act of participation and voice, a means of amplifi‐
cation via news coverage and social media virality, a ludic
yet political gestures, and a form of cultural production
and circulation.
3.3. The Transnational Circulation of Cultural References
Protest causes, identities, and repertoires of action travel
across national borders (della Porta & Mattoni, 2014,
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p. 9). Even nationally‐oriented protests, such as the case
examined here, entail various forms of mobilities across
national borders. Protesters often draw inspiration from
protests elsewhere, re‐appropriating their symbols and
their tactics (Chabot & Duyvendak, 2002). While protest
visuals can travel fast, spurring transnational mobiliza‐
tion or becoming seemingly global icons (Chabot &
Duyvendak, 2002; Mattoni & Teune, 2014; Mortensen,
2017; Mortensen & Trenz, 2016), less attention has been
devoted to their adaptation to local contexts (for an
exception, see Olesen, 2014). In particular, questions still
remain on which transnational cultural references are
taken up in national protest, how they become impli‐
cated in the local production of contention, andwhat the
ideological implications of their use are.
The transnational circulation of cultural refer‐
ences is conceptualized here with the help of broader
discussions of hybridity, glocalization, flows, and
de/reterritorialization. From a sociological perspective,
the merger of cultural resources anchored in different
local contexts can be understood as a form of glocaliza‐
tion (Robertson, 2012). The blending of the local and the
global (or glocalization) draws attention to how seem‐
ingly global ideas or expressions are localized, leading
to the creation of new cultural resources (Roudometof,
2016). Glocalization is a dialectical process, signaling
the increased interconnectedness of localities. Yet, glo‐
calization may also unwittingly universalize and stan‐
dardize an essentialist understanding of locality as syn‐
onymous with nationally bounded cultures (Robertson,
2012). Furthermore, the term “global” hides more than
it explains. The circulation of cultural resources often
follows from historical (e.g., colonialism) and recent hier‐
archies (e.g., transnational corporations), suggesting the
“global” is partial and contextual, better understood as
a “locally instigated wave [that] spreads throughout the
globe or close to it” that is refracted at the local level,
resulting in a plethora of glocalized cultural products
(Roudometof, 2016, p. 388).
Similarly, hybridity refers to the “fusion of two hith‐
erto relatively distinct forms, styles, or identities, cross‐
cultural contact, which often occurs across national bor‐
ders as well as across cultural boundaries” (Kraidy, 2005,
p. 5). Drawing from the traditions of international and
intercultural communication, hybridity destabilizes the
very notions local/global by challenging the view of cul‐
ture as static and territorially bounded. Instead, the his‐
torical circulation of signs and meanings is brought to
the fore, suggesting contemporary mixing processes are
different today only in accelerating the normalization of
hybridity as a sociocultural phenomenon (Kraidy, 2005).
Neither progressive nor subversive in itself, hybridity
can stimulate critical thinking, particularly in relation to
nationalismandethnic exclusivism—although it does not
necessarily unsettle them (Anthias, 1999; Thomas, 1998).
Like glocalization, hybridity can also bear the traces of his‐
torical and contemporary hierarchies. Thus, hybrid texts
may reflect colonial histories (Piot, 2001) or privilege
some national cultural resources over others (Anthias,
1999). Furthermore, hybridity favors social actors “with
the means to translate and name the world, while weak‐
ening the agency of other participants….The means and
ability to communicate are therefore an important deter‐
minant of agency in intercultural relations that form the
crucible of hybridity” (Kraidy, 2005, p. 152). Local social
actors engaged in the production of hybridized texts
often draw on their own external networks, which may
reflect specific forms of cultural capital; as such, they
are consequential to which external cultural resources
are brought in and which local cultural resources are
selected for the mixing process. In that sense, “the local
is at once a site of empowerment and marginalization”
(Kraidy, 2005, p. 155).
The normalization of hybridity remains an uneven
process, simultaneously celebrated and resisted as
it inevitably unsettles moral and material universes.
The various mobilities (flows) characterizing contem‐
porary societies (goods, money, people, technologies,
media, images, and ideas) compound this unevenness,
as each circulates in irregular ways that often remain
tributary to the “historical, linguistic, and political situ‐
atedness of different sorts of actors” (Appadurai, 1996,
p. 33). Under the impetus of pervasive mediatization,
these mobilities also generate “non‐places” (Augé, 1993,
as cited in Tomlinson, 1999, pp. 108–113) and “cultur‐
ally odourless” resources (Iwabuchi, 2002) that do not
bear—at least in an immediate way—clear connections
to nationally‐defined cultures. This can enhance their
circulation, spurring new forms of “cultural proximity”
(Iwabuchi, 2002), but it can also enable new forms of
agency and ownership rooted in a search for the “authen‐
ticity” of the local.
The ability to tap into transnational cultural
repertoires has been celebrated as an expression of
cosmopolitanism—that is, an outlook on the world
rooted in openness towards different cultures and in a
sense of global interconnectedness and moral responsi‐
bility. It can also be read as a struggle between structural
dominance and individual agency (Kraidy, 2005), a strate‐
gic choice (Skey, 2012), or an expression of (transcultural)
class affinities (Pieterse, 2015). The 2017 anti‐corruption
protests in Romania provide an opportunity to fur‐
ther capture the multifaceted struggle over visibility,
legitimacy, and power entailed in the re‐appropriation
of transnational cultural repertoires in contemporary
protest cultures.
4. Analyzing Protest Signs
This study has analyzed a set of 58 photographs of
different protest signs used during the first wave
of protests (January 31–February 15, 2017). This
set was constructed by collecting photographs of
protests from online archives assembled by local blog‐
gers and news media (e.g., https://www.lozinici.ro,
http://www.ziare.com, and http://www.artofprotest.ro)
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and from Instagram, by harvesting images posted with
one of the popular hashtags during these events (e.g.,
#altaintrebare, #coruptiaucide, #neamsaturat, #roma‐
niatrezeste, #romaniainstrada). While these sources
do not capture the totality of protest signs (some‐
thing that would be, in fact, impossible), they consti‐
tute a reasonable record of protest visuals, including
diverse protest times, locations, and vantagepoints from
where photographs were taken. Photos displaying legi‐
ble protest signs containing a transnational cultural ref‐
erence were retrieved and analyzed. Duplicates or minor
format/message variations were excluded.
This study is part of a bigger project that has included
my participation as an observer in a protest organized
by the Romanian diaspora in the Netherlands, followed
by fieldwork in summer 2018 in Romania. Having cul‐
tural and linguistic competencies was central to recog‐
nizing cultural references that, at the time of the protest,
counted as “transnational”. Such competencies are cru‐
cial, as “foreign” cultural references or the hybrids they
may lose their “foreignness” with time (Pieterse, 2015,
p. 95). I have also interviewed 30 individuals actively
engaged in protest mobilization across the country and
had several informal discussions with civil society rep‐
resentatives and faculty members. While this fieldwork
is not reported here, its insights inevitably informed the
analysis and interpretation process.Where possible, I sig‐
nal this in the reporting of the findings or discussion.
Given the lack of research on home‐made protest
signs and the specific interest in the meaning‐making
role of transcultural cultural references, I took an
exploratory approach tailoring the analysis process to
the two research questions. I started by identifying the
context of origin and the domain of reference used (e.g.,
politics, popular culture texts, etc.). Drawing from multi‐
modal discourse analysis (Machin & Mayr, 2012), I paid
attention to the use of transnational cultural references
to craft a political message, guided by questions such as:
• Which aspects of the original context of the refer‐
ence were retained in the process? For instance,
one protest sign re‐used the title of the novel
The Catcher in the Rye to play a pun upon the
Romanian translation of the word “the catcher”,
while another invoked The Animal Farm’s storyline
to compare the government to the authoritarian
regime described in the book.
• What type of knowledge was needed to recognize
the reference?
• Was there a possible and plausible connection
between the choice of reference and the broader
Romanian political imaginary?
• How was the reference used to make a statement
about local politics (people or events)?
• Which aesthetics and stylistic aspects of the
protest signs (e.g., figures of speech, rhyme, for‐
mat of text or illustration) were used?
5. The Meaning‐Making Work of Transnational Cultural
References in Protest Signs
Five categories of transnational cultural references were
used across the protest signs analyzed here.
First, political references included past and present
leaders, slogans, and events. Unsurprisingly given the
cause, placards evoked well‐known authoritarian lead‐
ers such as Stalin, Hitler, or Mao Zedong. Other iconic
political references were tied to either American (Barack
Obama’s electoral red/blue poster and Donald Trump’s
[in]famous quotes) or French politics (Louis XIV’s quote
“L’etat c’estmoi” [I am the state], the slogan of the French
revolution, and the slogan of the public response to the
Charlie Hebdo attacks, “Je suis Charlie”).
Second, even though computer culture has become
an everyday practice in Romania (although digital
divides remain important), the references discussed here
have not been produced in Romania. Popular games
(Pokémon and Pacman), websites (PornHub), and tech‐
nology companies (Google) provided material to cre‐
ate localized political messages, alongside references to
computer and internet symbols such as right‐click, hash‐
tags, emojis, meme templates, and terms of use.
Third, high and popular culture were a preferred
reservoir of transnational references for framing the
identity and cause of the protests (Milner, 2013; Rovisco,
2017). Posters drew from classical paintings (Da Vinci’s
Last Supper and Matsys’ The Ugly Duchess) and books
(Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye, Orwell’s Animal Farm,
and Shakespeare’s Hamlet), song lyrics (Muse’s Uprising
and The Police’s Every Breath You Take), and films/TV
series (StarWars, Star Trek,Game of Thrones, Lord of the
Rings, Captain America, Batman, Robin Hood, Pinocchio,
No Country for Old Men, Spiderman, Orange is the New
Black). US actor Chuck Norris, a classical Hitchcockian
image of scared female eyes, and the “Wanted” poster
aesthetic popularized by Western films were also used.
A few placards were created out of meme templates
based on superhero films—Batman slapping Robin and
Dr. Octopus, while some protesters cosplayed science fic‐
tion or superhero film characters.
Fourth, culture jams of brands played upon the slo‐
gans or logos of multi‐national corporations such as
Coca‐Cola, Nokia, Nike, and Victoria’s Secret, along with
Philip Morris’ cigarette brand Marlboro. They were less
common across the data set. While culture jamming’s
subversive ethos can fulfill an anti‐capitalist critique in
protest (Romanos, 2013), in this case it had a primarily
humorous function.
The final category included iconic symbols (slogans,
objects, and gestures) such as the feminist “We Can Do
It!” poster or the motivational “Keep Calm and Carry
On” poster, the Guy Fawkes (Anonymous) mask, and the
raised clenched fist.
These references illustrate the Romanian middle‐
class’ desired “cultural proximity” (Iwabuchi, 2002) with
the West (Gubernat & Rammlet, 2021; Kiss & Székely,
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2021). The classical Western canon (e.g., Da Vinci or
Shakespeare), but also popular films, songs, culture jams,
or computer culture speak not just of the mobility of
texts, but also of their usefulness for legitimizing the
local asWestern. While such references remain recogniz‐
able across different socioeconomic classes, they are nor‐
malized primarily among the professional, white‐collar
groups that have been instrumental to the (digital) mobi‐
lization in the 2017 anti‐corruption protests. This reading
was strengthened during my fieldwork, as interviewees
explained their vision of political governance as informed
by the allegedly objective organizational efficiency of the
multi‐national corporation. Most of them were young
professionals or local entrepreneurs, who had often trav‐
elled extensively or had established transnational busi‐
ness ties. Their grassroots digital leadership (Bakardjieva
et al., 2018) was enabled by their ability to strategically
and professionally deploy information and communica‐
tion technologies in protest (e.g., one citizen collective
proudly called itself “Geeks for Democracy”).
The use of such cultural references can then be rea‐
sonably read as strategic in the sense of participating
in the struggle between empowerment and marginaliza‐
tion unfolding at the local and regional levels (Kraidy,
2005). Historically, Romanian elites have looked towards
“foreign role models” to clear the country’s reputation
of the often negative “Balkan” or “Eastern” labels circu‐
lated in the West (Gallagher, 1997). Within the regional
dichotomy East/West, the grassroots use of the Western
cultural pool performs protesters as “true” Westerners.
Such cultural references, then, help protesters cast
their political claims as a fight between the “civilized”,
pro‐Western people and the “backward” strata lacking
“all the attitudinal and cultural requisites of a ‘normal’
(meaningmodern, developed, andWestern‐like) society”
(Kiss & Székely, 2021, p. 8; see also Abăseacă, 2018;
Gubernat & Rammelt, 2021).
5.1. The Semantic Usefulness of Recognizability
One use of the transnational cultural references in the
production of glocal protest communication relies on
their iconicity to draw attention to the protest cause
(Bartmanski, 2015). Where their original moral and polit‐
ical meanings are silenced, their recognizability is strate‐
gically re‐appropriated as an attention‐grabber. This was
the case of several references to then‐newly elected
US president Donald Trump. One placard, for instance,
replaced America in Trump’s electoral slogan “Make
America great again” with the names of Romanian pris‐
ons such as Jilava (the prison for political dissenters
during communism) and Rahova (a maximum‐security
prison formen). The resultingmessage targeted the polit‐
ical opponent: The idea of making prisons “great again”
directly engaged with the protesters’ requests to repeal
the extraordinary ordinance OUG13 and to punish cor‐
ruption. By putting corrupt politicians in jail, prisons
would be “great again.” Like many other signs—whether
using transnational cultural references or not—this one
was written in English. While this preserved the integrity
of the original reference and its iconic appeal, it also sig‐
naled an allegedly mundane integration of English into
the Romanian protest landscape.
Another placard used themobilization slogan against
the Charlie Hebdo attacks, “Je suis Charlie.” In its orig‐
inal context, the slogan conveyed a moral and politi‐
cal position: “Either you are in favour of free speech
and the right to offend or you are against” (Klug, 2016,
p. 223). In the 2017 anti‐corruption protests, this moral
and political meaning was erased, preserving only its
formulation in French (which presumably enhanced its
recognizability as an iconic slogan). One poster collaged
printed photographs of politicians seen by protesters as
corrupt. Under each photograph, the author had writ‐
ten: “Je suis plagiator. Je suis jefuitor. Je suis praduitor.
Je suis informator. Je suis prostul lor. Je suis infractor”
[I am someone who commits plagiarism. I am a rob‐
ber. I am a thief. I am an informant. I am their fool.
I am a criminal]. In the middle of the collage, the pho‐
tograph of the first post‐communist president with a
photo‐edited crown and the caption “Je suis tatal lor”
[I am their father]. Understanding this chain of significa‐
tion requires historical awareness of the political debates
in post‐communist Romania. Minimal understanding of
French may be needed for understanding, although the
iconic status of the slogan may ensure its translation
has become common knowledge. Furthermore, the plac‐
ard becomes funny through the rhyme of the chosen
Romanian words (all ending in “‐or”) and through the
confessional frame brought along by the French phrase
“I am X.” While some of these confessions refer to crim‐
inal deeds, two stand out and further contribute to the
comic effect: one seemingly admits he is not even a crim‐
inal but merely the others’ fool; the other introduces
former Romanian president Ion Iliescu (also a founder
and former president of PSD), made to confess “father‐
ing” all these forms of criminality and ultimately corrup‐
tion. Illustrating what Abăseacă (2018, p. 681) calls the
“unresolved issues of the past,” this protest sign histori‐
cizes corruption as a consequence of communism per‐
petuated by unfit political elites.
5.2. The Value of Generic Interpretive Frames
Other transnational cultural references, while still widely
recognizable, were used primarily for their generic
meanings, helping placard authors craft new political
messages. Such references provide over‐arching yet
simplistic interpretive frames adapted to highlight the
immorality of the local governing class. This is the case of
photo‐edited posters cropping the face of the PSD leader
Liviu Dragnea onto well‐known portraits of Stalin, Kim
Jung‐un, Mao, or Hitler. In most cases observed across
the sample, meaning‐making was achieved merely by
juxtaposing the Romanian to the transnational political
figures. The latter were signified via iconic signs: the
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hairdo and black costumes of the North Korean presi‐
dent, the Nazi uniform with the swastika armband, or
the propagandistic portrait of Stalin in uniform. Such
posters invite a reading of the PSD leader through the
generic interpretive frames associated with the other
political figures, such as their ruthless and totalitarian
rule. Carrying such a poster to protest is also perfor‐
mative, signifying citizen power in drawing politicians
accountable. Indeed, one of the most widely circulated
slogans during the protests was “We see you”: While a
reference to the importance of citizen accountability in
democracy, the protests themselves publicly embodied
this political value.
Film characters and titles constituted a second exam‐
ple of transnational cultural references used for their
generic political and moral connotations. With its over‐
arching frame of the battle between good and evil, the
Star Wars filmic universe has been a transnational sta‐
ple of protest (Gray, 2012). In the Romanian protests,
one poster edited Dragnea’s face onto an image of the
Emperor clad in a hooded dark robe, readying his arms
to use the force against his opponents. The poster also
included textual elements: “Emperor Dragnea,” “Darth
Corrupt,” and “PSD Strikes Back”—all in English. In this
case, the generic framing of the Star Wars character as
an evil ruler served to anchor Dragnea’s own character.
Yet, the connotation of such fictional tyranny is not only
political illegitimacy, but also its inevitable failure—as
the forces of good eventually prevail. Thus, the poster
implicitly announced the powerful politician’s impend‐
ing doom (something magnified by the presence of the
poster within a citizen protest against the government).
Indeed, the frame of resistance—where individuals suc‐
ceed, against all odds, defeating a totalitarian and pow‐
erful regime—has emerged transnationally in protest
(McClelland‐Cohen & Endacott, 2020, p. 850). In the
Romanian context, the hashtag of the protests (#rezist)
bears a striking—yet probably unrelated (according to
my participants)—resemblance to the use of #resist or
#TheResistance circulated in the anti‐Trump and the anti‐
Brexit movements (Monteverde & McCollum, 2020).
5.3. The Ludic Appeal
The placards’ mixing of transnational cultural references
with the local protest cause also constituted playful
expressions of “vernacular creativity.” While this can
work in tandem with the other two meaning‐making
functions above, it can be analytically distinguished as a
separate quality of the hybridization process. This qual‐
ity has to do with the unexpectedly creative and often
humorous articulation of meaning. Unexpectedness
depends on the viewer’s familiarity with protest signs,
remaining an interpretive and partial gesture. Yet, to the
protest participant seeing dozens or perhaps hundreds of
posters a night; or to the researcher perusing thousands
of photographs, the “unexpected” emerges inductively
from lived experience or the data.
Unexpectedness was generated through the use of
transnational cultural references not associated with
recent popular cultural texts. If superheroes and science
fiction characters spoke to the increasing popularity of
these genres over the last decade, Erol Flynn’s 1938depic‐
tion of Robin Hood, Chuck Norris’ martial arts film char‐
acters, or Shakespeare’sHamlet belonged to past cultural
flows. This was even more surprising given the protests
were largely associatedwith the young and urbanmiddle‐
class who might not have been familiar with them. For
instance, a beloved 1990s actor of then‐fashionable mar‐
tial arts films and series, Chuck Norris’ popularity in
Romania had been tied to the introduction of the VCR
and the diversification of commercial television stations.
One poster written in English read: “Chuck Norris, please
help!” invoking the (past) cultural significance of the
actor. At the time of being photographed, the placard
was carried by a child, enhancing its humorous appeal.
While the reference to Chuck Norris builds on his con‐
notation as a punisher of evil characters, other types
of (super)heroes are more popular today. In this case,
knowledge of past transcultural texts that have marked
the local context is needed to understand the poster.
Unexpectedness was also generated by the use of
transnational cultural references that did not seem to
speak about politics. This was the case of a placard com‐
paring Dragnea to Lord of the Rings’ Gollum. Where the
pairs Dragnea/Stalin or Dragnea/the Emperor (StarWars
universe) built on the image of evil rulers, his relation‐
ship to Gollum was less intuitive at first. The compari‐
son becomes meaningful when Gollum is read as a sym‐
bol of the nefarious consequences of lust for power. The
poster edited Dragnea’s face on a handcuffed Gollum,
while the Parliament building was added to the back‐
ground. The title of the poster read: “Lord of the Scums.”
Portraying Dragnea as a bold (albeit still donning his
iconic moustache), naked, and generally hideous char‐
acter; handcuffing and labelling him as the “Lord of the
Scums” added a humorous layer that both conveyed the
shared protest cause and discursively subverted the polit‐
ical leader’s power. In another poster, Dragnea’s facewas
pasted onto Erol Flynn’s iconic portrayal of Robin Hood,
captioned: “RobbingHood.” This associationwas also not
directly intuitive, as Robin Hood’s character is a symbol
of the poor stealing from the rich—where here it is use
the other way around. Written in English, the gerund
form of the verb “to rob” was anchored by the visual of
Dragnea to signal the idea of politicians stealing from the
state. Both cases requiremore than a basic knowledge of
English to appreciate the posters’ political message. Yet,
English or knowledge of the cultural text was not enough,
as understanding the message also required knowledge
of the local political context.
6. Conclusions
This study examined the meaning‐making work of
transnational cultural references in protest using the
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case of the 2017 #rezist protests in Romania. The ana‐
lysis revealed five types of references providing seman‐
tic material for the glocalization of protest communica‐
tion: political leaders and events, computer culture, high
and popular culture, culture jams, and other iconic sym‐
bols. Three dimensions of transnational cultural refer‐
ences facilitate their localization. First, such resources
were used because of their assumed recognizability
among protesters. Their concise, slogan‐like style was
re‐appropriated while their original political or moral
meaning was silenced. Second, transnational cultural ref‐
erences provided generic interpretive frames to craft
local political messages (with the added benefit of poten‐
tially generating transnational visibility). Third, their ludic
appeal mobilized “vernacular creativity,” commanding
attention through their unexpectedness and fusing not
only the local and the “foreign,” but also different genres
and texts. While these dimensions often co‐exist within
the same protest sign, analytically distinguishing them
systematizes the analysis of the transnational dimension
of protest communication.
It is tempting to read the use of transnational cul‐
tural references as an expression of banal cosmopoli‐
tanism (Skey, 2012; Szerszynski & Urry, 2002) or as a
normalization of hybridity (Kraidy, 2005) in protest com‐
munication. In the case examined here, the references
used in protest communication originated in theWestern
world. Their use constructs protesters as aligned with—
and thus, part of—Western cultural consumption and
political practices. This is not accidental, as it reflects
the political ambition of the Romanian middle‐class, seek‐
ing to separate itself from corruption (and, by extension,
from the communist legacy) and to position itself as the
voice ofWestern democratization/modernization. Indeed,
recent analyses have shown how the anti‐corruption
discourse in Romania draws its legitimacy from “the
widening rift between the ideology of ‘new Romania’
and that of ‘old Romania’, based on the dichotomy
between ‘Westernizers’ and ‘autochthonists’ ” (Gubernat
& Rammelt, 2021, p. 260; see also Kiss & Székely, 2021).
The article thus shows that, as with other forms
of cultural hybridity, the transnationalization of protest
communication remains permeated by and further impli‐
cated in the re‐construction of (local) hierarchies and
claims to power (Kraidy, 2005, p. 156). The use of
transnational cultural resources here is thus not merely
an expression of the imagined “cultural proximity”
between protesters and the original contexts making
these resources iconic, but also a political performance
making both regional and local claims to power. In addi‐
tion to their iconicity, generic frames, or creative poten‐
tial, the selection and use of transnational cultural
resources is political, allowing protesters to construct the
young, urban, and professional middle‐class as the site
of progress and democratization. In turn, their use also
normalizes the West as the local “global.”
The ability to creatively localize “foreign” cultural
resources has become a crucial skill in protest com‐
munication. Even though many transnational cultural
resources are recognizable across social strata, in the
Romanian context, the young and urban middle‐class
are more adept at fusing foreign languages (English and
French), computer culture and foreign politics with local
politics by virtue of their access to resources, includ‐
ing multiple mobility flows. In that sense, hybridiza‐
tion favors them (Kraidy, 2005). In turn, they are likely
to select resources that resonate with them and thus
express transnational class affinities (Pieterse, 2015,
p. 87). Considerations of the transnational dimension
of protest communication need to critically engage
with the socioeconomic divisions reproduced in and
through hybridization processes. While hybridization
can amplify the visibility of local protest and facili‐
tate transnational ties among protesters, it can also
alienate other (local) socio‐economic groups. Thus, in
addition to the meaning‐making functions afforded by
transnational cultural resources, the local politics of
their selection remain important in understanding their
inclusionary/exclusionary potential.
Finally, the contribution of some of these transna‐
tional cultural references to the blurring of the bound‐
aries between online and offline protest space requires a
brief note (De Luca et al., 2012;Milner, 2013). On the one
hand, meme templates and the deep‐fakes start online.
They speak to how the production of these protest
signs begins at home, drawing inspiration from the dig‐
ital space in multiple ways. Some of these protest signs
were shared as templates on social media, with follow‐
ers urged to download and bring them—whether person‐
alized or not—to the protest. Others used protest slo‐
gans or objects that circulate from one protest site to
another. On the other hand, references to computer cul‐
ture are brought to the streets to incriminate politicians
and their actions. For instance, in the Romanian protests,
a citizen brought along a printout of the pile of poo emoji.
The poster was carefully constructed: It was wrapped in
yellow tape and had a long stick enabling it to be raised
above the crowds. Such do‐it‐yourself projects appeal to
both participants and scholars as subversive and empow‐
ering tokens of “vernacular creativity.” Yet, the blending
of computer culture with street protest does not signal
only the “panmediated” nature of contemporary protests
(De Luca et al., 2012), but also a collective imaginary of
activism where digital technologies appear as seemingly
universal spaces and tools for grassroots political engage‐
ment. The inclusions/exclusions of this imaginary of digi‐
tal activism deserve further scholarly attention.
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